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James Venit (Dentons Partner)
Toulouse: TSE, March 25, 2022, 15:00–17:00, room Online by Zoom
Etienne Lehmann (CRED, Université Paris 1;Théories et Evaluations des Politiques Publiques;Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II)
TSE, March 25, 2022, 11:00–12:30, room Auditorium 3
We study the optimal tax system when taxpayers earn different kinds of income by supplying different inputs. Imperfect substitution between inputs allows for general equilibrium effects. We consider any type of cross-base responses to tax changes such as income-shifting. Formalizing the tax...
Thummim Cho (London School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, March 25, 2022, 10:00–11:30, room Auditorium 4
We propose a novel way to study asset prices based on price distortions rather than abnormal returns. We derive an exact identity linking current mispricing to subsequent returns, generating a price-level analogue to the fundamental asset pricing equation, E[MR^e] = 0, used to study returns. Our...
Josep Antoni Martín-Fernández
Toulouse: TSE, March 24, 2022, 11:00–12:15, room Auditorium 3
Compositional data require an appropriate statistical analysis because they provide the relative importance of the parts of a whole. Methods based on log-ratio coordinates give a consistent framework for analyzing this type of data. Any statistical model including variables created using the...
Clément Imbert (Unversity of Warwick)
March 24, 2022, 11:00–12:30, room Auditorium 4
We investigate the aggregate effects of rural to urban migration on receiving local economies. We proceed in three steps. First, we develop a model of firm dynamics that combines heterogeneous growth-profiles with the extensive and intensive margins of informality. Guided by the model, we use a...
Online, March 24, 2022, 09:00
Madrid, March 23–24, 2022
Emmanuel Guerre (Queen Mary, University of London)
TSE, March 22, 2022, 15:30–17:00, Online
We consider nonparametric identification of independent private value first-price auction models, in which the analyst only observes winning bids. Our benchmark model assumes an exogenous number of bidders N. We show that, if the bidders observe N, the resulting discontinuities in the winning bid...
Renata Gaineddenova (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
March 22, 2022, 14:00–15:00, Zoom Meeting
Asymmetric information about market participants’ valuations and costs plays a crucial role in the efficiency of a platform’s design. Using novel data from a ride-hailing platform called inDriver, I examine whether decentralizing the pricing mechanism improves market efficiency. Unlike its...
Estelle Cantillon
Toulouse: TSE, March 21, 2022, 11:00–12:15, room Auditorium 4
In the presence of uncertainty, information can both enhance efficiency and facilitate the exertion of market power. We explore this trade-off in the context of the New Zealand wholesale electricity market which operates a no-commitment predispatch market aimed at aggregating information before...
