Using network-structured economic games to study human cooperation, animus, and reputational dynamics in ecologically valid contexts

Abstract

In this talk, I outline the broad potential of network-structured economic games to address a large set of questions about human social relations, and their causes and consequences. I first discuss how such games address some of the key limitations of both classical economic games and self-report network methodologies. I then review some of my empirical research in Colombia, illustrating how network-structured economic games can be used to study both cooperation and animus in ecologically valid contexts: I present case studies on positive assortment, parochial altruism, negative indirect reciprocity, ostracism, and social perceptions of prestige and dominance. Finally, I make a pitch for building a collaborative, cross-cultural database of network-structured economic game data, and present some software packages I have co-developed that facilitate the collection, management, and analysis of social networks and dyadic peer ratings.