CANCELLED The Horizon of Investors’ Information and Corporate Investment

Laurent Frésard (Università della Svizzera italiana)

December 1, 2023, 14:00–15:15


Room Auditorium 4

Finance Seminar


We investigate whether the quality of investors’ information across horizons influences corporate investment. In our theory, managers under-invest because their stock price imperfectly reflects the value created by their projects. This effect is stronger when there is a mismatch between the horizon of the projects' cash flows and the horizon at which investors obtain information. Using a new hand-collected measure of projects' horizon, we find that improvements in the quality of investors' long-term (short-term) information induce firms with long-term (short-term) projects to invest more, particularly when managers prioritize current stock prices. Hence, the quality of investors’ information across horizons matters.


Project Horizon; Short-termism; Information Quality; Forecasting Horizon; Forecasts’ Informativeness; Managerial Incentives;

JEL codes

  • D84: Expectations • Speculations
  • G14: Information and Market Efficiency • Event Studies • Insider Trading
  • G17: Financial Forecasting and Simulation
  • M41: Accounting