Professional identity, bribery, and public service delivery: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Burundi

Abstract

We explore the relationship between self-identity and corruption through a newly designed experimental game that was played with public servants in Burundi. Our core hypothesis is that the connection between self-identity, i.e., how a person perceives her/him-self, and values make unethical behaviors such as corruption less likely. The participants were asked to allocate a limited number of vouchers between citizens while exposed to a bribe attempt. Prior to the game, participants were randomly assigned to a control and two treatment groups: the first group was exposed to a standard anti-corruption message, while the second one was exposed to a similar message that stressed the notion of self-identity. Results show that neither message has an effect on bribe acceptance, and only the self-identity message has a visible impact on the behaviour of the public servants, i.e., it is associated with a slightly fairer distribution of services. The dimensions of unfairness and bribery are not correlated, and the individual-level variables influencing them are different. The experiment provides both a new understanding of the dimensions of corrupted behaviour and a fresh insight into ways to design more cost-effective anti-corruption policies.