Political Influence over Bureaucrats: Evidence from Nigeria

Abstract

Bureaucratic behaviour is typically modelled as focussing on citizen welfare, ignoring political concerns that govern the behaviour of politicians. Politicians on the other hand face diff erent incentives across citizens. In some constituencies, politicians face strong competition for their position. In others, competition is low. Thus, politicians will have differing incentives across constituencies with respect to the provision of public goods. We analyse the influence politicians have on bureaucrats across different agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria. First, we model the way that political incentives shape which agencies politicians delegate to. Second, we assess whether politicians follow up this delegation with direct engagement with bureaucrats. Using unique data on the implementation of public projects across Nigeria, combined with surveys of civil servants from the implementing organisations, we are able to assess the interaction between politicians and government bureaucrats. By outlining politicians eff orts in delegation and monitoring, we can assess the impact of these behaviours on the productivity of public organisations. We find distinctive delegation patterns across government agencies driven by electoral concerns. Politicians then monitor these agencies differently, leading to differences in the provision of public projects across constituencies.