In a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and investment which affects the market structure of the supply side of the market. We show that more competitive equilibria are associated with a larger and more homogeneous distribution of investment among active suppliers, and an equilibrium with no investment might occur when competition is mild. In our model, buyer's investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition, and its effectiveness is positively related to the level of competition ex-post. In general, the equilibrium investment profile is lower than efficiency, and we surprisingly find that higher competitive markets may sustain a larger number of suppliers.
cooperative investment; investment distribution; competition;
- C72: Noncooperative Games
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44: Auctions
Guillem Roig, “What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co”, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-482, March 26, 2014.
TSE Working Paper, n. 14-482, March 26, 2014