Working paper

What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co

Guillem Roig


In a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and investment which affects the market structure of the supply side of the market. We show that more competitive equilibria are associated with a larger and more homogeneous distribution of investment among active suppliers, and an equilibrium with no investment might occur when competition is mild. In our model, buyer's investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition, and its effectiveness is positively related to the level of competition ex-post. In general, the equilibrium investment profile is lower than efficiency, and we surprisingly find that higher competitive markets may sustain a larger number of suppliers.


cooperative investment; investment distribution; competition;

JEL codes

  • C72: Noncooperative Games
  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D44: Auctions

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 14-482, March 26, 2014