We investigate the impact of revolving door on public procurement outcomes, combining 10 years of Brazilian health procurement data with a comprehensive employer-employee dataset tracking individuals’ job trajectories. We identify how movements between public administrations and private providers affect total contracting amounts and acquisition prices. Analyzing career changes in both directions, we uncover positive and negative effects, consistent respectively with reward for high-skill workers’ competence, and collusive behavior. Administration-to-supplier movements appear beneficial to public bodies, while supplier-to-administration ones are detrimental. This points to unexpected policy implications related to the tolerance of revolving door practices.
Revolving doors; Procurement; Public Officials Career Path; Personnel Economics.;
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73: Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
- H11: Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
- H57: Procurement
- J45: Public Sector Labor Markets
Klenio Barbosa, and Stéphane Straub, “The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement”, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-873, December 2017, revised May 2020.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-873, December 2017, revised May 2020