Abstract
In weak-state settings, clientelism is persistent yet normatively fraught, constituting a “legal gray area”. This study examines two key features of commonplace clientelism that may govern whether and to what extent citizens deem it punishable by the law. We posit a “par-ticularism penalty,” by which citizens desire greater punishment for actions targeting narrower social groups, and an “outgroup actor penalty”, by which preferred punishment is greater for ethnic-political opponents. A survey experiment with Kikuyu and Luo respondents in Kenya reveals that respondents prefer more punishment for explicitly targeting supporters — coethnics or copartisans — versus general people, with little difference between coethnics and co-partisans, regardless of the perpetrator’s partisanship. At the same time, they systematically prefer more punishment for partisan outgroup actors. These findings underscore that public opinion would support a legal evolution away from clientelism towards supporters, even as citizens remain more lenient towards ingroup members.
Reference
Jeremy Horowitz, Giacomo Lemoli, and Kristin Michelitch, “Penalties for Particularism and Partisanship? Citizens’ Preferences for Legal Punishment of Clientelism”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1603, December 2024, revised June 2025.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1603, December 2024, revised June 2025