Working paper

The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton, and Dominique Lepelley

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.

Keywords

Condorcet; Separable preferences; Logrolling; Vote Trading;

JEL codes

  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 17-755, January 2017