Abstract
The paper makes the case for a more systematic ex-ante assessment of the distribution of gains and losses from efficiency enhancing innovations that regulatory sandboxes are expected to test. It shows how a prior formal modelling of tests can inform the regulators on the possible need to control better upfront in the design of the sandbox for some otherwise underestimated but predictable distributional effects. Failing to do so is likely to lead to underestimate efficiency-equity trade-offs and other distributional issues, across stakeholders or within groups of stakeholders. Simple Industrial Organization models will often suffice to identify the potential issues at an early stage and allow better sandboxes designs and hence more reliable policy relevant results.
Keywords
Regulatory sandboxes; innovation; governance; anti-trust; regulation; efficiency; equity; quality standards;
JEL codes
- K20: General
- K21: Antitrust Law
- K23: Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15: Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O33: Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes
Reference
Claude Crampes, and Antonio Estache, “Efficiency vs. equity concerns in regulatory sandboxes”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1466, September 2023.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1466, September 2023