Michel Le Breton

Didier Laussel, and Michel Le Breton, “Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency ”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 100, 2001, pp. 93–128.

P. Ghirardato, and Michel Le Breton, “Choquet Rationality”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 90, 2000, pp. 277–285.

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Michel Truchon, “Choosing from a Weighted Tournament”, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 40, 2000, pp. 85–109.

Michel Le Breton, and Arunava Sen, “Separable Preferences, Decomposability and Strategyproofness”, Econometrica, vol. 67, 1999, pp. 605–628.

H. Konishi, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “On Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 85, 1999, pp. 122–139.

H. Konishi, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 79, 1998, pp. 224–244.

H. Konishi, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 72, 1997, pp. 225–237.

G. Laffond, Jean-François Laslier, and Michel Le Breton, “A Theorem on Two-Player Symmetric Zero-Sum Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 72, 1997, pp. 426–431.

Michel Le Breton, P. Moyes, and Alain Trannoy, “Inequality Reducing Properties of Composite Taxation”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 69, 1996, pp. 71–103.

John Duggan, and Michel Le Breton, “Dutta's Minimal Covering Set and Shapley's Saddles”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 70, 1996, pp. 257–265.

L. Epstein, and Michel Le Breton, “Dynamically Consistent Beliefs must be Bayesian”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 61, 1993, pp. 1–22.

G. Bordes, Michel Le Breton, and Maurice Salles, “On the Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives; General Results and Applications to Voting Games”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 17, 1992, pp. 509–518.

Michel Le Breton, G. Owen, and Shlomo Weber, “Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 20, 1992, pp. 419–427.

Michel Le Breton, and Maurice Salles, “The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 19, 1990, pp. 111–127.

G. Bordes, and Michel Le Breton, “Arrovian Theorems with Private Alternatives Domains and Selfish Individuals”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 47, 1989, pp. 257–281.

Michel Le Breton, and Alain Trannoy, “Measures of Inequality as An Aggregation of Individual Preferences About Income Distributions: the Arrowian Case”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 41, 1987, pp. 248–269.

Michel Le Breton, “On the Generic Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 43, 1987, pp. 374–382.