Working paper

How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?

Johannes Hörner, and Satoru Takahashi

Keywords

Repeated games; rates of convergence;

JEL codes

  • C72: Noncooperative Games
  • C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games

Replaced by

Johannes Hörner, and Satoru Takahashi, How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 165, September 2016, pp. 332–359.

Reference

Johannes Hörner, and Satoru Takahashi, How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?, TSE Working Paper, n. 17-792, March 2017.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 17-792, March 2017