Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue

Luis Cabral, and David Salant


We consider the problem of a seller who owns K identical objects and N bidders each willing to buy at most one unit. The seller may auction the objects at two different dates. Assuming that buyer valuations are uniform and independent across periods, we show that the seller is better off by auctioning a positive number of objects in each period. We also provide sufficient conditions such that most objects should be auctioned at the first date or in the second date.

JEL codes

  • D44: Auctions
  • D47: Market Design


Luis Cabral, and David Salant, Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue, Economics Letters, vol. 176, March 2019, pp. 1–4.

See also

Published in

Economics Letters, vol. 176, March 2019, pp. 1–4