Nudge: Towards a Consensus View?

Abstract

This article presents a particular viewpoint on how nudge should be understood. The concept of nudge has generated consid-erable interest among academics and policymakers. However, ten years later, what is meant exactly by “nudge” is still a matter of debate. In fact, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the (original) narrow definition of Thaler and Sunstein (nudge in the narrow sense, NN) and the (later) broad definition of Sunstein (nudge in the broad sense, NB). These two definitions differ regarding the instrumental use of rationality failures, and accordingly whether the provision or disclosure of information counts as a nudge or not. From a pragmatic perspective, the paper argues for a position that consists of adopting the broad definition of a nudge while acknowledging several types of nudges, which we provide in an integrative view. We suggest that future research should assess the effectiveness of these different types of nudges separately.

Keywords

Reference

Vincent Berthet, and Benjamin Ouvrard, “Nudge: Towards a Consensus View?”, Psychology and Cognitive Science, vol. 5, January 2019, pp. 1–5.