Abstract
The killer acquisitions theory states that established firms buy new businesses to pre-empt future competition, particularly in the pharmaceutical and digital industries. The theory fuels demand to make merger policy more restrictive. • But is the theory of killer acquisitions supported by empirical facts? • Focusing on past investigations by the European Commission in information technology industries, this article studies whether acquisitions by large technology companies reduce competition by eliminating future rivalry. • Despite the small sample size, the findings suggest that none of the reviewed transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation.
Keywords
killer acquisitions, case study, dynamic competition, innovation, mergers and acquisitions, nascent competitors;
JEL codes
- G34: Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software
- O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Replaces
Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, and Selçukhan Unekbas, “Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from EC Merger Cases in Digital Industries”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1420, March 2023, revised October 2024.
Reference
Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, and Selçukhan Unekbas, “Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from European Merger Cases”, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 86, n. 3, December 2024, pp. 647–678.
See also
Published in
Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 86, n. 3, December 2024, pp. 647–678