The paper shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision. Keywords: monetary policy, funding liquidity risk, strategic complementarities, macro-prudential supervision
monetary policy; funding liquidity risk; strategic complementarities; macro-prudential supervision;
- E44: Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E52: Monetary Policy
- G28: Government Policy and Regulation
Emmanuel Farhi, and Jean Tirole, “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts”, TSE Working Paper, n. 09-052, June 2009, revised October 2010, 49 pages.
Emmanuel Farhi, and Jean Tirole, “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts”, American Economic Review, vol. 102, February 2012, pp. 60–93.
American Economic Review, vol. 102, February 2012, pp. 60–93