Advantageous selection without moral hazard

Philippe De Donder, Marie-Louise Leroux, and François Salanié


Advantageous selection occurs when the agents most eager to buy insurance are also the cheapest ones to insure. Hemenway (1990) links it to differences in risk-aversion among agents, implying different prevention efforts, and finally different riskinesses. We argue that it may also appear when agents share the same attitude towards risk, and in the absence of moral hazard. Using a standard asymmetric information setting satisfying a single-crossing property, we show that advantageous selection may occur when several contracts are offered, or when agents also face a non-insurable background risk, or when agents face two mutually exclusive risks that are bundled together. We illustrate this last effect in the context of life care annuities, a product bundling long-term care insurance and annuities, by constructing a numerical example based on Canadian survey data.


Propitious selection; Positive or negative correlation property; Contract bundling; Long-term care insurance; Annuity;

JEL codes

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • I13: Health Insurance, Public and Private


Philippe De Donder, Marie-Louise Leroux, and François Salanié, Advantageous selection without moral hazard, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, May 2023.

Published in

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, May 2023