To attend the conference, please contact the secretariat Elvire Jalran
- Renato GOMES, Toulouse School of Economics,Directeur de thèse
- Takuro YAMASHITA, Toulouse School of Economics, Examinateur
- Daniel GARRETT, University of Essex, Rapporteur
- Sinem HIDIR, University of Warwick, Rapporteure
- Carole HARITCHABALET, Université de Pau et des pays de l'Adour,Invitée
This dissertation studies the effect of mechanism choices on technology choices by the agents. The first chapter studies the effect of trade mechanisms on agents' choice of production technologies and contributes to a better understanding of how the principal can shape the ex-post distribution of types optimally. The second chapter studies an environment in which misbehavior and detection technologies are endogenous. The main result of the paper describes technology cycles in these environments. Using this result, the paper studies the effect of policy changes on both the amount of misbehavior and the intensity of investments by fraudsters and monitors. The third chapter of the thesis studies resource allocation in the presence of moral hazard. The key insight from the paper is that under certain conditions, the principal and the agent can disagree on the optimal resource allocations. As a result, when the resource allocation is observable only to the agent, this creates additional frictions which could benefit or hurt him depending on the production function.