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Manufacture des Tabacs, Toulouse, France: Université Toulouse I, June 5–6, 2009
Pierre Boyer (TSE/GREMAQ AND EHESS)
Toulouse: TSE, June 4, 2009, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
This paper studies public good provision and the equity-efficiency trade-off in a three-tier hierarchy. A Prime Minister, an inequality-averse utilitarian planner, is at the top, the citizens at the bottom and a Spending Ministry in between. The citizens are privately informed about their public...
Vera Zaporozhets (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economic)
Toulouse: TSE, June 4, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MC 203
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model...
Glen Weyl (Harvard Society of Fellows)
Toulouse: TSE, June 2, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
Pass-through rates play an analogous role in imperfectly competitive markets to elasticities under perfect competition. Log-curvature of demand links the pass-through of cost and production shocks to the division between consumer and producer surplus. Therefore in a wide range of single-product,...
Christian Bontemps (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, May 2009
Thibault Larger (TSE - GREMAQ - ENAC)
Toulouse: TSE, May 28, 2009, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
The paper's main contribution is to argue that for a certain class of cost functions, Minimal Differentiation can occur when firms vertically differentiate on one dimension. In a sequential game where two firms compete in prices, I show that either maximal or minimal differentiation occur...
Nancy Qian (Brown University)
Toulouse: TSE, May 28, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
This paper investigates the extent to which the government can strategically distort a free media market by examining the e¤ect of the U.S. State Department's bias in human rights reporting on coverage in the New York Times. To establish causality, we exploit a novel source of variation in the...
May 28–29, 2009
Agustín Pérez-Barahona (Paris 1 & Ecole Polytechnique)
Toulouse: TSE, May 26, 2009, 11:00–12:00, room MC 407
We present an OLG model in which life expectancy and environmental quality dynamics are jointly determined. Agents may invest in environmental quality, depending on how much they expect to live. In turn, environmental conditions affects life expectancy. The model produces multiple steady-states (...
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, May 26, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Case Law regime over the Statute Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the...
