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Peter Robinson (LSE)

Toulouse: TSE, December 8, 2009, 15:30–16:30, room MF 323

Nonparametric regression with spatial, or spatio-temporal, data is considered. The conditional mean of a dependent variable, given explanatory ones, is a nonparametric function, while the conditional covariance reflects spatial correlation. Conditional heteroscedasticity is also allowed, as well as...

Seminar

Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California)

Toulouse: TSE, December 8, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323

We propose a new model of firm reputation that interprets reputation directly as the market belief about product quality. Quality is persistent and is determined endogenously by the firm's past investments. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the firm's reputation and derive implications...

Seminar

Mirko Wiederholt (Northwestern University)

Toulouse: TSE, December 7, 2009, 15:00–16:30, room MH 205

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rational inattention. Households and decision-makers in firms have limited attention and decide how to allocate their attention. We study the implications of rational inattention for business cycle dynamics. We find that the...

Seminar

Timo Goeschl

Toulouse: TSE, December 7, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MH 205

Are prices or quantities the best regulatory instrument to align private actions with public interests in the presence of externalities? We add another dimension to this ongoing debate by experimentally analyzing the interaction between instrument choice and intrinsic motivation of regulated agents...

Seminar

December 7–8, 2009

Conference

Sebastian Koehne (University of Mannheim)

Toulouse: TSE, December 3, 2009, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323

Moral hazard models with hidden saving decisions are useful to study such diverse problems as unemployment insurance, income taxation, executive compensation, or human capital policies. How can we solve such models? In general, this is very difficult. Under the conditions derived in this paper,...

Seminar

Michael Grimm (Institute of Social Studies - The Hague)

Toulouse: TSE, December 3, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323

There is a well-known debate about the role of institutions in explaining the long-term development of countries. We believe there is value-added to consider the institutions hypothesis at the micro level within a country to analyze the exact transmission channels linking endogenous institutional...

Seminar

Martijn Han (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE), University of Amsterdam)

Toulouse: TSE, December 2, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323

This paper argues that commonly observed fixed-term renewable employment contracts may increase cartel stability. When managerial appointments are renewed if and only if the firm performs well, cartel stability depends not only on (i) the conventional tradeoff between the immediate monetary gain of...

Seminar

Levent Kockesen (Koç University)

Toulouse: TSE, December 1, 2009, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323

It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games with...

Seminar

Gilles Saint-Paul

Toulouse: TSE, November 30, 2009, 17:00–18:30, room MF 323

Seminar