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Robert B. Wilson (Stanford University)
Toulouse: TSE, November 9, 2010, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
We impose three axioms on refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed nonempty subsets, called solutions. Undominated Strategies: Each equilibrium in a solution uses undominated strategies. Backward Induction: Each solution contains a quasi-perfect...
Victor Rios-Rull (University of Minnesota)
Toulouse: TSE, November 8, 2010, 14:30–16:00, room MF 323
We build a model where demand shocks look like productivity shocks despite technology being constant. Frictions in goods markets allow shoppers (computers and investors) to play a central role in expanding output via a competitive search mechanism. We estimate the required demand shocks that...
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (University of Princeton)
November 8, 2010, 12:30–14:00, room MD 001
We develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. We use the framework to address two issues in particular: First, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity;...
Rahmi Ilkilic
Toulouse: TSE, November 8, 2010, 11:00–12:30, room MH203
Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex...
Robert B. Wilson (Nobel Prize 2007)
Toulouse, France, November 8, 2010
Christoph Schottmüller (Tilburg University)
Toulouse: TSE, November 4, 2010, 12:45–14:00, room MF323
Adverse selection models are used to analyze contracting in many subfields of economics like regulation, labor economics, monopoly pricing, taxation or finance. Most authors assume single crossing. This simplifies the analysis as local incentive compatibility is in this case sufficient for global...
Antoine Salomon (ENPC)
Toulouse: TSE, November 4, 2010, 12:30–14:00, room MC 205
We study strategic interaction between several agents who are facing an exploration vs. exploitation dilemma. In game theory, this situation is well described by models of bandit games. Each player faces a two-arm bandit machine, one arm being safe, the other being risky. At each stage of the game...
Cyril Monnet
October 26, 2010
Ingela Alger (Carlton University)
Toulouse: TSE, October 25, 2010, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
We build and extend on research on the evolution of co-operation in games with continuous strategies, by analyzing species where individuals are familiar with each others’behavioral inclinations and adapt their own behavior accordingly. In a model where altruistic or spiteful preferences, rather...
Syngjoo Choi (University College London)
Toulouse: TSE, October 21, 2010, 15:30–17:00, room MF 323
We report on the results of a large-scale field experiment that enables us to test for consistency with utility-maximizing behavior and to investigate the correlation between individual behavior and demographic and economic characteristics. We conducted the experiment with the CentERpanel (a...
