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Anna Dreber (Stockholm School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, September 29, 2011, 15:30–17:00, room MF 323
Competitiveness is typically measured by the performance change when going from a piece-rate scheme to a tournament or by the choice of performing in a tournament or in a piece-rate scheme. Men are often found to be more competitive than women with both measures. In this talk I will discuss to what...
Augustin Landier, and Guillaume Plantin
Toulouse, France, September 29, 2011
Larbi Alaoui (University of Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
Toulouse: TSE, September 27, 2011, 11:00–12:30, room Amphi S
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals often prefer to avoid observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot accommodate these cases, since it...
Nicholas Trachter (EIEF - Rome)
Toulouse: TSE, September 26, 2011, 17:00–18:30, room Amphi S
We characterize the optimal anticipated monetary policy in economies where agents have precautionary savings motives due to random production opportunities and the presence of borrowing constraints. Non storable production makes intrinsically useless outside money valuable to insure consumption. We...
Igor Muraviev (International College of Economics & Finance, Moscow)
Toulouse: TSE, September 26, 2011, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
The paper analyzes the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a situation where competition exists both upstream and downstream, and both sides have balanced and differentiated bargaining power. It devel- ops the framework of sequential bilateral negotiations between two rival manufacturers...
Toulouse, France: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, September 26–27, 2011
Guillaume Vigeral (Université Paris Dauphine)
Toulouse: TSE, September 23, 2011, 13:45–15:00, room MS 003
We consider some two-player zero-sum stochastic games played on the circle. At each stage the state of the game rotates by an angle depending on the actions played by both players. For some fixed length of the game n, the goal of the first player is to maximize the Cesaro mean of the payoffs...
Biritta Augsburg (IFS)
Toulouse: TSE, September 22, 2011, 11:00–12:30, room MF323
We use a randomized controlled trial to analyze the impact of microcredit on poverty reduction among Bosnian households without prior access to finance. The participants consist of 1,200 individuals that EKI, a Bosnian microfinance institution, would normally have just rejected on the basis of its...
Toulouse, France, September 22–23, 2011
Thierry Magnac (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, September 20, 2011, 15:30–17:00, room Amphi S
We propose a model of on-the-job human capital investments in which individuals differ in their initial human capital, their rate of return, their costs of human capital investments and their terminal values of human capital at retirement. We derive a tractable reduced form Mincerian model of log...
