Jump to navigation
Joël Peress
November 19, 2012
Jacob K. Goeree (California Institute of Technology)
Toulouse: IAST, November 15, 2012, 15:30–16:30, room MF323
We employ laboratory methods to study stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf’s economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilib- rium they oscillate without...
Nina Yin (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, November 15, 2012, 13:45–14:00, room MF 323
This paper assesses the welfare gains from incremental innovation in pharmaceuticals. Such innovation can yield consumer gains through improved quality, but the additional market exclusivity granted to innovators may also delay generic entry, a practice referred to as "evergreening." Quantifying...
Sergio Urzua (University of Chicago)
Toulouse: TSE, November 13, 2012, 15:30–17:00, room MS001
Between 1984 and 1989 more than 20,000 tons of toxic chemicals containing high concentrations of lead were brought to the city of Arica (in northern Chile). Initially, the chemical waste was located several kilometers from the city. The rapid expansion of Arica in the early 1990s, which included...
Juan Carlos Escanciano (University of Indiana)
Toulouse: TSE, November 13, 2012, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
This paper proposes efficient tests for restrictions on finite-dimensional parameters in regular semiparametric models. Our theory overcomes the main limitation of the existing theory, which requires explicit computation and estimation of certain projections onto infinite-dimensional tangent spaces...
Sergio Santoro
November 13, 2012
Gilles Saint-Paul (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, November 12, 2012, 17:00–18:30, room MS 001
This paper studies the trade-offs that an expert with ideological biases faces in designing his model. I assume the perceived model must be autocoherent, in that its use by all agents delivers a self-confirming equilibrium. The exercise is carried in the context of a simplified AS-AD model, where...
Fabien Gensbittel (Toulouse School of Economics - GREMAQ)
Toulouse: TSE, November 12, 2012, 15:00–16:00, room MF 323
We introduce in this work a model of repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on one side. At the beginning of the game, a state of nature is chosen randomly, and the first player receives a sequence of informative signals about this state variable all along the play while the second...
Otto Toivanen (KU Leuven)
TSE, November 12, 2012, 14:00–15:30, room MS 003
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish cartels. One third of these clauses relate to raising profits. The remaining clauses deal with the instability of the cartel arrangement through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats....
Sylvain Sorin (Université Pierre et Marie Curie)
Toulouse: TSE, November 12, 2012, 14:00–15:00, room MF 323
Les principes de programmation dynamique ont été étendus en temps continu (conduisant aux équations HJB) et pour les jeux à 2 joueurs et à somme nulle (opérateur de Shapley). On peut utiliser la même approche pour étudier la limite des valeurs de jeux répétés via un passage en temps continu
