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Cheng Wan (Université Pierre et Marie Curie - IMJ)
TSE, March 15, 2013, 13:45–15:00, room MS 001
Dans un jeu de congestion dans un réseau, un joueur non-atomique génère un flot infinitésimal, alors qu'un joueur atomique divisible (resp. divisible en entiers) contrôle un flot fini qui peut se diviser arbitrairement (resp. en plusieurs parties de poids en nombre entier) sur des routes...
Paul Whelan
March 15, 2013
Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus School of Economics, Netherlands)
Toulouse: TSE, March 14, 2013, 15:30–17:00, room MF 323
This paper studies the effect of learning new information on ambiguity attitudes. We decompose ambiguity attitude into two parts, pessimism (capturing ambiguity aversion) and likelihood insensitivity and introduce a simple method to measure these two parts empirically. We study the effect of...
Christine Grün (University of Bonn)
TSE, March 14, 2013, 14:00–15:00, room MS 002
Nous étudions des jeux d'arrêt optimal en temps continu à information incomplète. Pour modéliser l'incomplétude des informations, nous supposons qu'il existe des états de la nature différents dans laquelle le jeu peut avoir lieu. Avant que le jeu commence, l'état est choisi au hasard. L'...
André Stenzel (University of Mannheim)
Toulouse: TSE, March 14, 2013, 12:45–14:00, room MS001
We analyze a strategic security design and trading game as in Dang et al. [7] but with a generalized structure of public information arrival. In the absence of private information, optimal securities are those least affected by interim public information. We provide conditions such that all...
Jishnu Das (World Bank)
Toulouse: TSE, March 14, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
Private primary care providers routinely account for more than 50 percent of first-contacts in low-income settings, rising to 80 percent in countries like India. The majority of these providers operate in single provider clinics with little regulatory oversight or government subsidies. No patients...
Manufacture, Toulouse, France, March 14–15, 2013
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (Paris School of Economics)
Sheheryar Banuri (World bank)
Toulouse: IAST, March 13, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
Matthew Shum (California Institute of Technology)
Toulouse: TSE, March 12, 2013, 15:30–17:00, room MS 001
We estimate a model of strategic voting with incomplete information in which committee members - judges in the US courts of appeals - have the opportunity to communicate before casting their votes. The model is characterized by multiple equilibria, and partial identification of model parameters....
