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Eugen White
March 12, 2013
Frank Verboven (University of Leuven)
TSE, March 11, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
We analyze a large merger in the Swedish market for analgesics (painkillers). We confront the predictions from a merger simulation study, initiated during the investigation, with the actual merger effects over a two-year comparison window. The merger simulation model predicted a large price...
Hans Degryse
TSE, March 11, 2013, 12:30–14:00, room MF 323
Theory shows that the non-exclusivity of financial contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect credit availability. Using internal information on a creditor’s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor...
Chuck Mason (University of Wyoming)
Toulouse: TSE, March 11, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
For decades resource economists have relied on the seminal Hotelling paper to model extraction and price paths, despite overwhelming evidence of the empirical limitations of the approach. Particularly in oil markets, the shortcomings of the Hotelling approach are evident: for over 100 years real...
Andres Santos (University of California, San Diego)
Toulouse: TSE, March 5, 2013, 15:30–17:00, room Amphi S
This paper examines the efficient estimation of partially identified models defined by moment inequalities that are convex in the parameter of interest. In such a setting, the identified set is itself convex and hence fully characterized by its support function. We provide conditions under which,...
Morten Bech
March 5, 2013
Tommy Andersson (University of Lund)
Toulouse: TSE, March 1, 2013, 13:45–15:00, room MF 323
In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by the government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, a weaker equilibrium concept is suggested. Given...
Harry Di Pei (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, February 28, 2013, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
I develop a theory of communication in which experts need to gather information at a cost before giving advice to decision makers. In contrast with the canonical sender-receiver game in which the sender's information is exogenous and costless, I show that first, the sender always communicates all...
Theocharis Grigoriadis (UC Berkeley)
Toulouse: IAST, February 21, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
Laura Ralston (MIT)
Toulouse: IAST, February 20, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MS001
