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Justine Hastings (University of Brown)
TSE, May 27, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
This paper examines how advertising impacts competition and equilibrium prices in the context of a privatized pension market. We use detailed administrative data on fund manager choices and worker characteristics at the inception of Mexico’s privatized social security system, where fund managers...
Adrien Vogt-Shilb (CIRED)
Toulouse: TSE, May 27, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
Climate mitigation is largely done through investments in low-carbon capital that will have long-lasting effects on emissions. In a model that represents explicitly low-carbon capital accumulation, optimal marginal investment costs differ across sectors. They are equal to the value of avoided...
Samuele Centorrino (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, May 24, 2013, 12:30–13:30, room MF 429
Lyon, France, May 24, 2013
Nicolas Dupuis (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, May 23, 2013, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
In transport industries, constraints on the number of available seats, booking deadlines, and heterogeneous potential buyers allow for intertemporal price discrimination, as shown by the widely spread practice of revenue management. This practice obviously increases the company's profit since it...
Manufacture des Tabacs - Building S, Toulouse, May 23–24, 2013
Igor Kheifets (New Economic School - Moscow)
Toulouse: TSE, May 21, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
This paper proposes new specification tests for dynamic models with discrete responses. In particular, we test the specification of the conditional distribution of multinomial and count data, which is key to apply efficient maximum likelihood methods, to obtain consistent estimates of partial...
Stephan Lauermann (University of Michigan)
Toulouse: TSE, May 21, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
We study a first-price auction for a single good with common values. The novel feature is that the number of bidders is endogenous: the seller (auctioneer) knows the value and solicits bidders. Soliciting bidders is costly. The bidders privately observe noisy signals of the true value, as in the...
Gerald Schneider (Konstanz Univ)
Toulouse: IAST, May 21, 2013, 09:30–11:00, room MF323
Jean Bernard Lasserre (LAAS-CNRS and Institute of Mathematics, University of Toulouse)
Toulouse: TSE, May 17, 2013, 13:45–15:00, room MF 323
