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Glen Weyl (University of Chicago)
Toulouse: TSE, September 13, 2013, 10:15–11:30, room MS001
Toulouse: TSE, September 13, 2013, 10:00–11:15, room MS001
A group of individuals with access to transfers seeks to make a binary collective decision. All known mechanisms they might use are either are often inefficient (e.g. voting), subject to severe collusion problems (e.g. the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism) or require the planner being informed about...
Miles S. Kimball
September 13, 2013
Vasia Panousi (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System-Washington)
Toulouse: TSE, September 9, 2013, 17:00–18:30, room MS001
We examine the optimal taxation of capital in a general-equilibrium heterogeneousagent economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic investment or capital-income risk. Our framework combines elements from the Ramsey and the Mirrlees traditions, as we consider a linear tax but also introduce lump-sum...
Jean-Charles Rochet
TSE, September 9, 2013, 12:30–14:00, room MF 323
We analyze the determinants of government debt under the twin assumptions that governments have limited horizons and default only when government income falls short of debt service requirements. We derive a government’s maximum sustainable debt ratio, that is, the debt ratio chosen by a myopic...
Laura Veldkamp
September 3, 2013
Aaron Tornell
July 9, 2013
Lisbonne, Espagne, July 7, 2013
Christopher M. Meissner
July 2, 2013
Christian Nguenang (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, June 28, 2013, 12:30–13:30, room MF 429
