Jump to navigation
Jean-Marc Robin (Paris School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, September 30, 2013, 17:00–18:30, room MS 001
In this paper, we quantify the contribution of labor market reforms to unemployment dynamics in nine OECD countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). We build and estimate a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with...
Yassine Lefouili (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, September 30, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
This paper examines the cross-licensing agreements between N>2 patent holders who compete in a downstream market. It is shown that, under a laissez-faire policy, bilaterally efficient agreements allow firms to achieve the industry profit-maximizing outcome. A legal upper bound on the per-unit...
Erik Loualiche (MIT-Sloane)
IDEI, September 30, 2013, 12:30–14:00, room MF 323
I study the implications of uctuations in new firm creation across industries for asset prices and macroeconomic quantities. I write a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous industries, allowing for firm entry and time variation in markups. Firms entering an industry increase competition and...
Xingyi Liu (Toulouse School of Economics - GREMAQ)
Toulouse: TSE, September 30, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
We studied the impact of vertical integration on investment incentives and social welfare when both upstream and downstream firms make innovative investments. First, we show that vertical integration has larger impact on upstream investments than on downstream investments. When upstream inputs are...
François Gourio
September 27, 2013
Nava Ashraf (Harvard Business School)
Toulouse: TSE, September 26, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
Nikola Tarashev
September 26, 2013, BDF, Paris
Pedro Carneiro (University College London)
Toulouse: TSE, September 24, 2013, 15:30–17:00, room MS 001
Balasubrahmanian Ravikumar (Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis)
Toulouse: TSE, September 23, 2013, 17:00–18:30, room MS 001
We present evidence that fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed is the most relevant incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The...
Laurent Lamy (Paris School of Economics)
TSE, September 23, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
We propose a new model of auctions with endogenous participation where the number of bidders from each group of potential entrants follows a Poisson distribution. The model allows very general forms of asymmetries by imposing no structure on the valuation distribution of each group of entrants but...
