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Beat Hintermann (University of Basel)
Toulouse: TSE, November 4, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
We develop a theory of social planning with a constraint on economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers’ actual utility, and the "counterfactual" utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. The social planner limits economic coercion, either...
Ed Nosal
October 29, 2013
Alexandre Debs (University of Yale)
Toulouse: TSE, October 24, 2013, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
What are the causes of hegemonic wars among interdependent great powers? We argue that an economically dependent challenger faces a hold-up problem, when deciding whether to engage a hegemon peacefully. The hegemon cannot commit to offer generous terms of peace, given its domination of the...
Dan Cao (University of Georgetown)
Toulouse: TSE, October 21, 2013, 17:00–18:30, room MS 001
We develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and Tobin’s q . A firm is financed partly by insiders, who control its assets, and partly by outside investors. When their wealth is scarce, insiders earn a rate of return higher...
Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan)
TSE, October 21, 2013, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
Financial constraints are an important impediment for the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how collateral availability for a particular type of small entrepreneur, namely potential franchisees, affects the moral hazard problem of franchisees exerting effort and...
Mathieu Rosenbaum (Université Pierre et Marie Curie)
Toulouse: TSE, October 18, 2013, 14:00–15:15, room MF 323
A l'échelle ultra haute fréquence, la notion de prix d'un actif financier est très ambiguë. En effet, beaucoup de prix différents peuvent être définis: meilleur prix à l'achat, meilleur prix à la vent, prix moyen, etc. Ainsi, en pratique, les participants de marché font face au problème du choix de...
Manfred Milinski (Max Planck Institute)
Toulouse: IAST, October 18, 2013, 11:30–12:30, room MS001
Florian Scheuer (University of Stanford)
Toulouse: TSE, October 18, 2013, 10:00–11:15, room MS 001
We develop a unifying framework for optimal income taxation in multi-sector economies with general patterns of externalities. Agents in this model are characterized by an N-dimensional skill vector corresponding to intrinsic abilities in N potentially externality-causing activities. The private...
Redmond, Washington, October 18–19, 2013
Erik Voeten (Georgetown University)
Toulouse: IAST, October 17, 2013, 15:30–16:30, room MF323
Oil-exporting states occupy a paradoxical position in the international system. Economically, they tend to be highly globalized, meaning dependent on international trade, finance, and labor. They are also the source of the world’s single most valuable commodity, and hence highly influential. Yet...
