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Edouard Schaal (University of New York)
TSE, October 13, 2014, 17:00–18:00, room MS 001
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of business cycles with coordination failures. Because of an aggregate demand externality, firms only want to produce when other firms do as well. The presence of variable capacity utilization leads to multiple equilibria under perfect...
Maarten Janssen (University of Vienna)
TSE, October 13, 2014, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
Traditionally, search model assume consumers hold passive beliefs about prices they have not yet observed. In richer search environments where consumers also care about retailers' cost, this paper argues that symmetric beliefs are often more appropriate and yield quantitatively and qualitatively...
Brett Green
IDEI, October 13, 2014, 12:30–14:00, room MF 323
We study the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic multistage agency setting. Specifically, there is a project, whose benefits are realized only after multiple sequential breakthroughs. The project requires funding from the principal and is operated by an agent who is protected by limited...
Tristan Tomala (HEC, Paris)
Toulouse: TSE, October 10, 2014, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
Extending the framework of revision games studied in Kandori and Kamada (2011) and Calcagno et al. (2013), we consider games with finite sets of players, actions and states. Opportunities to play arrive in continuous time according to a Poisson process. At an arrival, players can change actions and...
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (Toulouse School of Economics - GREMAQ)
TSE, October 10, 2014, 11:00–12:15, room MS 003
Edouard Schaal
October 10, 2014
Jean-Philippe Platteau (Université de Namur)
Toulouse: TSE, October 9, 2014, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
This paper proposes a principal-agent model of the aid donor-recipient relation- ship in which the donor monitors the use of aid and administers sanctions when some fraud is detected. Its original feature is the assumed comparability between domestic and donor-imposed disciplines. We show that,...
Paul Scott (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, October 7, 2014, 15:30–17:00, room MS 001
We show that direct measurement of value functions allows for identification of dynamic discrete choice models without restrictive "normalization" assumptions in traditional settings as well as settings with incomplete data on state variables. Using data on US cropland use, empirical results...
Magali Champion (Université Toulouse 3 - IMT)
Toulouse: TSE, October 7, 2014, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
In this presentation, we focus on a theoretical analysis and the use of statistical and optimization methods in the context of sparse linear regressions in a high-dimensional setting. The first part of this work is dedicated to the study of statistical learning methods, more precisely penalized...
Bruno Strulovici (University of Northwestern)
Toulouse: TSE, October 7, 2014, 11:00–12:30, room MC 203
This paper analyzes an explicit protocol of contract negotiation between a principal who has all the bargaining power and an agent with a privately known type, and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in such environments. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture...
