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Toulouse, France, February 3, 2015, room MS 003
Jean-Charles Rochet
IDEI, January 26, 2015, 12:30–14:00, room MS 001
This paper proposes a simple theory of credit cycles that focuses on the role of bank capital and financing frictions. We build a continuous time general equilibrium model of an economy in which banks finance their loans by deposits andequity, while facing issuance costs when they raise new equity...
Paris, France, January 19 to January 19, 2015
Toulouse, France, January 15, 09:00 to January 16, 2015, 18:00
Augustin Landier (Toulouse School of Economics), and Guillaume Plantin (Sciences Po, Paris)
January 15, 2015, BDF, Paris
Mattia Girotti (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, January 13, 2015, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
This paper explores the eff ects of monetary policy shocks on banks' liability structures and funding costs. Banks obtain most of their funding from a combination of demand deposits -- i.e. zero-interest deposits -- and interest-bearing deposits. Using local demographic variations as instruments...
Toulouse, France, January 8–9, 2015
Pascal Boyer (Washington University in St. Louis)
Toulouse: IAST, December 18, 2014, 15:30–16:30, room MF323
Institutions in many domains display common features in very different human groups. Explaining these commonalities requires more than economic rationality and historical path-dependence. Specific capacities and preferences in human minds, as a result of evolution by natural selection, make certain...
Luc Bridet (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse: TSE, December 18, 2014, 12:45–14:00, room MF 323
Entrepreneurs seeking credit are prone to understating the risks they face and adopt too optimistic a view of their future prospects in order to reduce the anxiety involved with high-stakes, long-term ventures. This tendency exposes them to predatory lending practices that are detrimental in...
Matthieu Bouvard (Mc Gill University)
Toulouse: TSE, December 17, 2014, 10:30–12:00, room MS003
We present a theory in which deficiencies in risk management arise from a coordination failure. Firms choose privately optimal risk management regimes to be competitive in a market with shortlived trading opportunities, but the aggregate outcome can be a constrained inefficient “race to the bottom...
