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Bernard Salanié (University of Columbia)
Toulouse: TSE, March 8, 2016, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called \roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a...
Urban Jermann
March 8, 2016
Simon P. Anderson (University of Virginia)
TSE, March 7, 2016, 14:00–15:30, room MF 323
We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games and use inclusive best reply func- tions to compare long-run market structures. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The IIA property of demands (CES and logit) implies that consumer surplus depends on the aggregate alone, and...
Darrell Duffie
IDEI, March 7, 2016, 12:30–13:45, room MF 323
Size discovery is the use of trade mechanisms by which large quantities of an asset can be exchanged at a price that does not respond to price pressure. Primary examples of size discovery include \workup" in Treasury markets and block-trading \dark pools" in equity markets. By freezing the...
Kyle Meng (University of California - Santa Barbara)
Toulouse: TSE, March 7, 2016, 11:00–12:30, room MS 003
Planetary-scale events, such as climate change, generate heterogeneous impacts across individuals. If risks are shared completely, aggregate risk is a sufficient statistic for the global welfare e↵ects of such events. However, if risk sharing is incomplete, then the global welfare consequences of...
Boualem Djehiche (KTH- Department of Mathematics – Stockholm)
Toulouse: TSE, March 4, 2016, 14:00–15:15, room MF 323
We suggest a method of characterizing optimal contracts in the classical setting of Principal- Agent problem under hidden action for time inconsistent utility functions. We consider two different models; Hidden Action in the weak formulation and Hidden Contract in the strong formulation. In the...
Jörgen W. Weibull
Toulouse: IAST, March 4, 2016, 11:30–12:30, room MS001
Ali Shourideh (University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School)
TSE, March 1, 2016, 17:00–18:30, room MS 001
We study optimal fiscal and redistributive policies in an open economy without commitment. Due to its redistributive motives, the government’s incentive to default on its external debt is affected by inequality. We show that in equilibrium the economy endogenously fluctuates between two regimes. In...
James Venit (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP)
Toulouse: TSE, February 19, 2016, 15:30–17:30, room MF 323
TSE, February 16, 2016, 15:30–17:00, room MS 001
Multivalued treatment models have only been studied so far under restrictive assumptions: ordered choice, or more recently unordered monotonicity. We show how marginal treatment effects can be identified in a more general class of models. Our results rely on two main assumptions: treatment...
