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Toulouse, France, May 28–29, 2018, room MS001
Aart Gerritsen (Erasmus School of Economics, Netherlands)
TSE, May 24, 2018, 14:00–15:30, room Salle MC 204
We analyze the redistributional (dis)advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the (in)efficiency of labor rationing. Compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change, a minimum-wage increase raises involuntary unemployment,...
Michela Tincani (University College London)
Toulouse: TSE, May 24, 2018, 11:00–12:30, room MF 323
Gérard Kerkyacharian (Université Pierre et Marie Curie - LPSM)
Toulouse: TSE, May 24, 2018, 11:00–12:15, room MC 204
On essayera de montrer que de nombreux problèmes de statistiques nécessitent de dépasser le cadre Euclidien (Tomographie, Astrophysique ..). Dans cet exposé on se propose de montrer que l'on peut récupérer beaucoup de résultats obtenues grâce à l'analyse de Fourier, si l'on travaille sur un espace...
Edward (Ted) Jaenicke (Penn State University)
TSE, May 24, 2018, 11:00–12:30, room MS 117
We estimate food waste at the individual household level indirectly using a stochastic production frontier approach. The estimated average percentage of waste is about 30%-32%. In addition to a baseline model, we also develop a second model that tackle the issue of missing information on physical...
Manufacture des Tabacs, S Building, Toulouse, France, May 24–25, 2018
Daniel Ershov
TSE & IAST, May 23, 2018, 12:30–13:30, room MF323
Firms considering to enter into online markets face significant demand uncertainty. It is not clear what type of product is going to be successful as there are many potential niches. They also face consumer search costs, with consumers most likely finding previously successful products in the...
Matthieu Bouvard (McGill University)
Toulouse: TSE, May 22, 2018, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
Toulouse: TSE, May 22, 2018, 11:00–12:30, room MS 001
We study robust/adversarial information design in global games of regime change. We show that the optimal policy coordinates all market participants on the same course of action. Importantly, while it removes any \strategic uncertainty," it preserves heterogeneity in \structural uncertainty". When...
Falko Fecht
May 22, 2018
