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Daniel F. Garrett, and Alessandro Pavan

vol. 159, September 2015, pp. 775–818

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash flows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that distortions (aka, wedges) under optimal contracts may either increase or decrease over time. In particular, when the manager's...

Michael Magill, Martine Quinzii, and Jean-Charles Rochet

vol. 83, n. 5, September 2015, pp. 1685–1725

There is a widely held view within the general public that large corporations should act in the interests of a broader group of agents than just their shareholders (the stakeholder view). This paper presents a framework where this idea can be justified. The point of departure is the observation...

Heidi Colleran, Peter T. Ellison, Andrzej Galbarczyk, Grazyna Jasienska, Magdalena Klimek, Inger Thune, and Anna Ziomkiewicz

vol. 27, n. 5, September 2015, pp. 667–673

Marcel Boyer, and Rachidi Kotchoni

vol. 47, n. 2, September 2015, pp. 119–153

Connor and Lande (Issues in competition law and policy, pp 2203–2218, 2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31–49 %. By examining more sources, Connor (Price-fixing overcharges, 2nd edn. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610262,...

Paul Lagunes, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (eds.)

September 2015

Henrik Andersson, James K. Hammitt, and Kristian Sundström

vol. 66, n. 3, September 2015, pp. 727–752

This paper examines the value of reducing foodborne risk. Previous research on the valuation of health risk has been dominated by the study of mortality risk. However, in most cases foodborne illnesses are non-fatal, so we focus on individuals’ preferences for reducing morbidity risk, while also...

Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi, and Nicolas Vieille

vol. 83, n. 5, September 2015, pp. 1795–1848

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Chiara Canta, and Pierre Dubois

vol. 15, n. 4, September 2015, pp. 1939–1973

We study spousal peer effects on smoking and their implication for the health of children. Smoking decisions are modeled as equilibrium strategies of an incomplete information game within the couple. Using French data, we identify two peer effects: a smoking enhancing effect of smoking partners and...

Mike Hoy, and Nicolas Treich

vol. 40, n. 2, September 2015, pp. 89–96

Stéphane Straub

Paul Lagunes, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (eds.), September 2015