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Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, and Jianyu Yu

2015

Matthieu Bouvard, P Chaigneau, and A de Motta

vol. 70, n. 4, 2015, pp. 1805–1837

We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency...

Frédérique Bec, and Christian Gollier

vol. 134, 2015, pp. 5–19

Jean-François Bonnefon, and Matthew Haigh

vol. 62, n. 3, 2015

We examine how the beliefs and desires of a protagonist are used by readers to predict their intentions as a narrative vignette unfolds. Eye movement measures revealed that readers rapidly inferred an intention when the protagonist desired an outcome, even when this inference was not licensed by...

Emmanuelle Auriol, and Sara Biancini

vol. 29, n. 1, 2015, pp. 1–40

Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that, subsequent to integration, welfare decreases in both...

Guillaume Cheikbossian

vol. 125, n. 1, 2015, pp. 145–169

Dans cet article, nous étudions l'aptitude des membres d'un groupe à coopérer dans leurs activités de recherche de rentes afin de renforcer leurs position dans le conflit qui les opposent à une institution en place pour l'attribution d'une rente. Plus précisément, nous considérons un jeu répété...

Andrew Rhodes

vol. 82, 2015, pp. 360–390

We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it...

Sridhar Arcot, Zsuzsanna Fluck, José-Miguel Gaspar, and Ulrich Hege

vol. 115, 2015, pp. 102–135

Céline Bonnet, and Vincent Réquillart

Oxford University Press, chapter 4, 2015, pp. 65–101

Catarina Goulão, and Luca Panaccione

vol. 35, n. 1, 2015

In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 6 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can in uence the likelihood of states of 7 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 8 in a pool of promises of deliveries of...