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Dale Whittington, Céline Nauges, David Fuente, and Xun Wu

vol. 34, 2015, pp. 70–81

It is conventional wisdom that poor households use less water than rich households, and intuition suggests that an increasing block tariff with a lifeline block will target subsidies to poor households. In this paper we provide a simple diagnostic tool that a water utility can use to estimate the...

Xavier Irz, Pascal Leroy, Vincent Réquillart, and Louis-Georges Soler

vol. 39, 2015, pp. 188–201

The effect of consumers’ compliance with nutritional recommendations is uncertain because of potentially complex substitutions. To lift this uncertainty, we adapt a model of consumer behaviour under rationing to the case of linear nutritional constraints. Dietary adjustments are thus derived from...

Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens, and Doh-Shin Jeon

vol. 60, 2015, pp. 33–42

This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if each buyer’s type has a non-negative virtual valuation for each object, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle; weaker conditions...

Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, and Jad M. Chaaban

2015

Carla Barlagne, Pascale Bazoche, Alban Thomas, Harry Ozier-Lafontaine, François Causeret, and Jean-Marc Blazy

vol. 57, 2015, pp. 62–72

Ensuring the success of agriculture is at the heart of food security, and it is necessary to examine strategies that tackle agricultural development through the production and consumption of sustainable food products. One way to increase food security in small island states is to develop local food...

Yassine Lefouili

vol. 137, December 2015, pp. 135–139

This paper investigates the effect of yardstick competition on firms’ incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations. We show that an increase in the intensity of yardstick competition, for which we provide a natural measure, increases the incentives to innovate.

Emmanuelle Auriol, and Sara Biancini

vol. 29, n. 1, 2015, pp. 1–40

Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that, subsequent to integration, welfare decreases in both...

Guillaume Cheikbossian

vol. 125, n. 1, 2015, pp. 145–169

Dans cet article, nous étudions l'aptitude des membres d'un groupe à coopérer dans leurs activités de recherche de rentes afin de renforcer leurs position dans le conflit qui les opposent à une institution en place pour l'attribution d'une rente. Plus précisément, nous considérons un jeu répété...

Andrew Rhodes

vol. 82, 2015, pp. 360–390

We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it...

Catarina Goulão, and Luca Panaccione

vol. 35, n. 1, 2015

In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 6 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can in uence the likelihood of states of 7 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 8 in a pool of promises of deliveries of...