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Markus Reisinger (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management)
TSE, September 16, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
We analyze vertical contracting between a manufacturer and retailers who have correlated private information. The manufacturer chooses the retail market structure and secretly contracts with each retailer. We highlight a new trade-off between the manufacturer's goal to limit downstream competition...
Alon Brav
Toulouse, September 16, 2019, 12:30–14:00, room MF323
September 16–17, 2019, room MS003
Nathan Miller (Georgetown University)
TSE, September 9, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
We study an infinitely-repeated game of oligopolistic price leadership in which one firm, the leader, proposes a supermarkup over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. We estimate the model with aggregate scanner data on the beer industry and find the supermarkup accounts for 6% of price. Price...
Matti Keloharju
Toulouse, September 9, 2019, 12:30–14:00, room MF 323
Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
Toulouse: TSE, September 9, 2019, 10:00–11:30, room MS 001
We show that majority rule is uniquely characterized among voting rules by strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness. Furthermore, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any preference...
Hyatt Regency Paris Etoile, Paris, September 9, 2019
CNAM, Paris, September 5–6, 2019
Hidenori Takahashi (Hitotsubashi University)
TSE, September 2, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room MS 001
Procurement contracts often involve substantial uncertainty in project outcomes at the time of bidding. Whether the procurer of a contract bears such project risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. Using data from the Florida Department of Transportation, we document evidence that i)...
Centre Pierre Baudis, July 9–12, 2019
