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Luc Julia (Samsung)
TSE & IAST, November 15, 2019, 15:30–16:30, room MS003
Pascale Déchamps (OXERA), and Ambroise Descamps (OXERA)
Toulouse: TSE, November 14, 2019, 17:00–18:00, room MS 001
Björn Richter (University of Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
November 12, 2019, BDF Paris
Anne Perrot (Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF))
Toulouse: TSE, November 8, 2019, 15:30–17:30, room MS001
Néofytos Rodosthenous (Faculty of Economics and Queens’ College, University of Cambridge)
Toulouse: TSE, November 7, 2019, 11:00–12:15, room MS003
We consider decision makers who are impatient when the prices of their assets are in undesirable low regions for a significant amount of time, and they are also nervous and risk averse to negative price jumps. We wish to study the unusual reactions of investors under such adverse market conditions...
Mike Ostrovsky (Stanford University - Graduate School of Business)
TSE & IAST, November 6, 2019, 12:30–13:30, room MS003
We study the interplay between autonomous transportation, carpooling, and road pricing. We discuss how improvements in these technologies, and interactions among them, will affect transportation markets. Our main results show how to achieve socially efficient outcomes in such markets, taking into...
Morten Olsen (University of Copenhagen)
TSE, November 5, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
Do higher wages lead to more automation innovation? To answer this question, we first introduce a new measure of automation by using the frequency of certain keywords in the text of patents to identify automation innovations in machinery. We validate our measure by showing that it is correlated...
Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford graduate School of Business)
Toulouse: TSE, November 5, 2019, 11:00–12:30, room MS001
This paper studies the design of monitoring policies in dynamic settings with moral hazard. The firm benefits from having a reputation for quality, and the principal can learn the firm's quality by conducting costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: An incentive role, because the outcome of...
Seonghoon Cho (Yonsei University, Korea)
November 5, 2019, BDF Paris
Jidong Zhou (University of Yale)
TSE, November 4, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room MS001
This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures which allow pure-strategy Bertrand equilibria, we derive signal structures which are optimal for firms and those which are optimal for...
