Jump to navigation
Alexandra Alvergne (University of Oxford)
Toulouse: IAST, December 6, 2019, 11:30–12:30, room A1
Contraceptive discontinuation is a major barrier to reducing global unmet needs for family planning, but the reasons why women discontinue contraception are poorly understood. Here we use data from Ethiopia to investigate (i) the magnitude of contraceptive discontinuation in 2005–2011, (ii) how the...
Jing Cai (University of Maryland;Maryland Agricultural Economics)
December 5, 2019, 11:00–12:30, room A2
We measure the direct and indirect effects of access to finance using a randomized experiment with 3,100 firms in 78 local markets in China, which created variation in firms’ access to a new loan product both within and across markets. Our estimates imply that: (1) Financial access has large...
Olga Gorelkina (University of Liverpool - Management School)
Toulouse: TSE, December 5, 2019, 09:30–11:00, room Auditorium 2
This paper studies collusion via certified sharing of information in the context of mechanism design. The model of collusion builds on Aumann’s (1976) description of knowledge. A cartel can agree to collude on a contract if it is common knowledge within the cartel that the contract is incentive...
Manufacture des Tabacs, Toulouse, December 5–6, 2019, room MS 001
Toulouse, Manufacture des Tabacs, December 5–6, 2019, room MQ 212
Métaprogramme Did it
Bernhard Rieder (Université d’Amsterdam)
TSE & IAST, December 4, 2019, 12:30–13:30, MS 003
One of the defining characteristics of (large) online platforms is the heavy reliance on algorithmic techniques (machine learning, network algorithms, etc.) for tasks like search, recommendation, and matching. These techniques pose a number of problems to both researchers and regulators interested...
Marianne Bertrand (University of Chicago)
Toulouse: TSE, December 3, 2019, 16:00–17:30, room MB 1
Toulouse, December 3, 2019
Joao Montez (HEC, Lausanne)
TSE, December 2, 2019, 14:00–15:30, room A1
We study the incentives for a monopoly incumbent to reach an early entry agreement that allows a generic to enter just before its patent expires, and its consumer and social welfare effects. In our model entry by more than one entrant is unprofitable. In the absence of an agreement, the entry game...
Nathan Yang (McGill University)
TSE & IAST, November 29, 2019, 12:30–13:30, room MH 002
Under the context of digital health, I explore the potential opportunity costs associated with giving customers a sense of success. Using large-scale data from a popular mobile fitness application, I show that many users who enjoy certain past successes (e.g., daily goal achievement) need not...
