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Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)
Toulouse: TSE, January 20, 2020, 14:00–15:30, room Auditorium 3
Agents about to engage in economic transactions may take costly actions to influence their own or others' information: costly signaling, information acquisition, hard evidence disclosure, and so forth. We study the problem of optimally designing a mechanism to be robust to all such activities,...
Cristina Caffarra (Charles River Associates)
Toulouse: TSE, January 17, 2020, 15:30–17:30, room Auditorium 5
Ludovic Orlando (AMIS)
Toulouse: IAST, January 17, 2020, 11:30–12:30, room Amphi A3
After more than three decades of research, ancient DNA has now come of age. The complete genome sequence of hundreds of ancient individuals has been characterized and genome-scale datasets are under development using thousands of archaeological remains from both humans and non-human organisms. This...
Koen Jochmans (Cambridge University)
Toulouse: TSE, January 16, 2020, 14:00–15:30, room Auditorium 3
We consider inference in linear regression models that is robust to heteroskedasticity and the presence of many control variables. When the number of control variables increases at the same rate as the sample size the usual heteroskedasticity-robust estimators of the covariance matrix are...
Anne-Laure Delatte
January 16, 2020, BDF, Paris
Eva Vivalt (Australian National University)
Toulouse: TSE, January 15, 2020, 14:00–15:30, room Auditorium 3
Evidence-based policymaking requires not only evidence, but also for policymakers to update their beliefs based on that evidence. We examine how policymakers, researchers, and development practitioners update in response to results from academic studies, using a unique opportunity to run an...
Toulouse, January 9–10, 2020
Hal Varian
Toulouse: TSE, January 8, 2020, 17:00–18:00, room MB 3
Bastien Chabé-Ferret (LISER - Luxembourg Institute for Socio Economic Research)
TSE, December 20, 2019, 11:00–12:30, room T335
Tiziano De Angelis (University of Leeds)
Toulouse: TSE, December 19, 2019, 11:00–12:15, room Auditorium 2
In this talk I will consider two types of Dynkin game with non-standard information structures. The first one is a zero-sum game between two players who observe a geometric Brownian motion but in which the minimiser knows the drift of the process whereas the maximiser doesn't know it. We construct...
