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Xavier D'Haultfoeuille, Isis Durrmeyer, and Philippe Février
vol. 86, n. 5, October 2019, pp. 1973–1998
In markets where sellers are able to price discriminate, individuals pay different prices that may be unobserved by the econometrician. This paper considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model à la Berry et al. (1995) with such price discrimination and limited information on...
José-Raimundo Carvalho, Thierry Magnac, and Qizhou Xiong
vol. 10, October 2019, pp. 1233–1277
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are...
Stéphane Straub
Mark Roberts, Frederico Gil Sander, and Sailesh Tiwari (eds.), chapter 6, October 2019
Benjamin Ouvrard, Jens Abildtrup, Göran Bosted, and Anne Stenger
n. 164, October 2019
The use of biomass, in particular wood, has increased this last decade as a result of the European Union's objectives to reduce the use of fossil energies. This has amplified the use of whole-tree harvesting and the exploitation of forest residues from traditional timber harvest. However, these...
Paul Beaudry, Patrick Fève, Alain Guay, and Franck Portier
vol. 34, October 2019, pp. 221–243
In SVARs, identification of structural shocks can be subject to nonfundamentalness, as the econometrician may have an information set smaller than the economic agents’ one. How serious is that problem from a quantitative point of view? In this paper we propose a simple diagnostic for the...
Chiara Canta, and Helmuth Cremer
vol. 119, October 2019, pp. 548–566
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policies when children differ in their cost of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to a “bequest rule” specifying a transfer (gift or bequest) conditional on the level of informal care. Care provided by high-cost...
Francesc Dilmé, and Daniel F. Garrett
vol. 17, n. 5, October 2019, pp. 1654–1686
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in of- fending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and...
Arnaud Pocheville, Sabine Noebel, Guillaume Isabel, and Etienne Danchin
vol. 366, n. 6462, October 11, 2019
Thornquist and Crickmore claim that systematic experimental error may explain the results of Danchin and colleagues. Their claim rests on mistakes in their analyses, for which we provide corrections. We reassert that conformity in fruitflies predicts long-lasting mate-preference traditions.
Fabien Gensbittel
vol. 9, n. 3, September 2019, pp. 671–699
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was already studied in Cardaliaguet et al (Math Oper Res 41(1):49–71...
Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer, and Kerstin Roeder
vol. 118, September 2019, pp. 37–50
The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they...
