Abstract
We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society’s values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents’ general willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals social externalities. We also shed light on norms-based interventions, societies’ resistance to economists’ messages, and the avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments.
Keywords
motivation; incentives; social norms; expressive law;
JEL codes
- D64: Altruism • Philanthropy
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- H41: Public Goods
- K1: Basic Areas of Law
- K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Social and Economic Stratification
Replaces
Roland Bénabou, and Jean Tirole, “Laws and Norms”, TSE Working Paper, October 2010, revised October 2011.
Reference
Jean Tirole, and Roland Bénabou, “Laws and Norms”, Journal of Political Economy, 2025, 59 pages, forthcoming.
See also
Published in
Journal of Political Economy, 2025, 59 pages, forthcoming