Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

Résumé

Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

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Référence

David Martimort et Jérôme Pouyet, « Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1501, janvier 2024.