Document de travail

The value of incumbency for heterogeneous platforms

Gary Biglaiser et Jacques Crémer

Résumé

We study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new way of representing the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with two platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; compute the profits of the incumbent and demonstrate that the incumbency advantage does not improve much, if at all, when going from a static to a dynamic framework.

Remplacé par

Jacques Crémer et Gary Biglaiser, « The Value of Incumbency When Platforms Face Heterogeneous Customers », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, novembre 2020, p. 1–43.

Référence

Gary Biglaiser et Jacques Crémer, « The value of incumbency for heterogeneous platforms », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-630, mars 2016, révision novembre 2016.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 16-630, mars 2016, révision novembre 2016