Document de travail

Timing Vertical Relationships

Richard Ruble, Bruno Versaevel et Étienne de Villemeur

Résumé

We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g. an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a Lerner index, which is related to the parameters of a stochastic downstream demand. When feasible, vertical restraints restore efficiency. For instance, the upstream firm can induce entry at the correct investment threshold by selling a call option on the input. Otherwise, competition may substitute for vertical restraints. In particular, if two firms are engaged in a preemption race downstream, the upstream firm sells the input to the first investor at a discount that is chosen in such a way that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical externality, and this leader invests at the optimal market threshold.

Codes JEL

  • C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D92: Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Référence

Richard Ruble, Bruno Versaevel et Étienne de Villemeur, « Timing Vertical Relationships », TSE Working Paper, n° 10-181, 23 juin 2010.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 10-181, 23 juin 2010