Secret contracting in multilateral relations

Résumé

We develop a general, tractable framework of multilateral vertical contracting, which places no restriction on tari§s and fully accounts for their impact on downstream competition. Equilibrium tariffs are cost-based and replicate the outcome of a multi-brand oligopoly, a finding in line with the analysis of a recent merger. We provide a micro-foundation for this framework, before analyzing the effect of RPM and price parity provisions, and of resale vs. agency business models. Finally, we extend the framework to endogenize the distribution network; we also consider mergers and show that their impact on the distribution network can dominate price effects

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Codes JEL

Référence

Patrick Rey et T. Verge, « Secret contracting in multilateral relations », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-744, décembre 2016, révision décembre 2020.