We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive of the agents on the value creation side may conflict with the platform’s incentive to internalize externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict, pooling can be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agent diverge from those of the average agent on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination. We provide an application to an optimal design of privacy and advertising policies for a platform mediating consumers and advertisers.
platform; price discrimination; two-sided markets; non-responsiveness; Spence effect.;
- D4: Market Structure and Pricing
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L5: Regulation and Industrial Policy
- M3: Marketing and Advertising
Doh-Shin Jeon, Byung-Cheol Kim et Domenico Menicucci, « Second-degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-690, septembre 2016, révision novembre 2019.
TSE Working Paper, n° 16-690, septembre 2016, révision novembre 2019