Document de travail

Residual Deterrence

Daniel F. Garrett et Francesc Dilmé

Résumé

Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.

Mots-clés

deterrence; reputation; switching costs;

Codes JEL

  • C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
  • K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Remplacé par

Francesc Dilmé et Daniel F. Garrett, « Residual Deterrence », Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 17, n° 5, octobre 2019, p. 1654–1686.

Référence

Daniel F. Garrett et Francesc Dilmé, « Residual Deterrence », TSE Working Paper, n° 19-1029, juillet 2019.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 19-1029, juillet 2019