Résumé
This paper studies an information intervention designed and implemented in the context of a school assignment mechanism in Mexico City. We find that providing students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds with feedback about their academic performance contributes to placing applicants in schools that better fit their skills, allowing them to gradu-ate on time from high school at a higher rate. We also quantify the effect of a counterfactual and yet feasible implementation of the information intervention at a much larger scale. Simula-tion results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in the demand-side responses, which trigger sorting and displacement patterns within the assignment mechanism. The equilibrium effects of the intervention may possibly hinder the subsequent academic trajectories of high-achieving and socio-economically disadvantaged students.
Mots-clés
Information; Subjective expectations; Beliefs updating; Biased beliefs; School choice; Discrete choice models; Control function; Stable matching;
Codes JEL
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- I21: Analysis of Education
- I24: Education and Inequality
- J24: Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
Référence
Matteo Bobba, Veronica Frisancho et Marco Pariguana, « Perceived Ability and School Choices: Experimental Evidence and Scale-up Effects », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-660, juin 2016, révision mai 2023.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 16-660, juin 2016, révision mai 2023