Résumé
This paper explores an information intervention designed and implemented within a school assignment mechanism in Mexico City. Through a randomized experiment, we show that providing a subset of applicants with feedback about their academic performance can enhance sorting by skill across high school tracks. We embed the experimental variation into an empirical model of schooling choice and outcomes to assess the impact of the intervention for the overall population of applicants. Feedback provision is shown to increase the eciency of the student-school allocation, while congestion externalities are detrimental for the equity of downstream education outcomes.
Mots-clés
Information; Subjective expectations; Beliefs updating; Biased beliefs; School choice; Discrete choice models; Control function; Stable matching;
Codes JEL
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- I21: Analysis of Education
- I24: Education and Inequality
- J24: Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
Remplacé par
Matteo Bobba, Veronica Frisancho et Marco Pariguana, « Perceived Ability and School Choices: Experimental Evidence and Scale-up Effects », Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2026, à paraître.
Référence
Matteo Bobba, Veronica Frisancho et Marco Pariguana, « Perceived Ability and School Choices: Experimental Evidence and Scale-up Effects », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-660, juin 2016, révision mars 2026.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 16-660, juin 2016, révision mars 2026