Document de travail

Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values

Daniel F. Garrett

Résumé

We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers'randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.

Codes JEL

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies

Remplacé par

Daniel F. Garrett, « Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values », American Economic Review, vol. 106, n° 11, novembre 2016, p. 3275–3299.

Référence

Daniel F. Garrett, « Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-679, juillet 2016.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 16-679, juillet 2016